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In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1966.

No. 1161.
JOHN W. TERRY, et al.,

Petitioners,
vs.
STATE OF

o:mo,

Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.
To the Honorable Chief Justice and the Associate Justices
of the Su.preme Cou.rt of the United States:

OBJECTIONS TO JURISDICTION.
There is no substantial federal question involved
which would require this Court to review this case.
The questions herein presented were raised both in
the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and the
Supreme Court of Ohio. The Court .of Appeals affirmed
in an opinion reported as State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. (2d)
122; 214 N. E. (2d) 114; 34 0. 0. (2d) 237. The Ohio
Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.
The Ohio courts decided this case in accordance with
the statutes of the State of Ohio and in accordance with
the Constitution of the United States and the applicable
decisions of this Court. There is therefore no substantial
federal question involved.
326
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED.
The respondent cannot subscribe to the questions
presented by counsel for appellant and amicus. Their
questions are taken out of context and present a distorted
impression of the facts in the record. They then assume
incorrect conclusions of fact and fix them in a basic
premise and follow with an incorrect conclusion.
The respondent submits that the following questions
are presented in this case:

I. Can the protection guaranteed to individuals by
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States be said to encompass any absolute right irrespective of such restraints as the safety and
welfare of the public may require?
II. Is the exercise of "stop and frisk" based on probable cause a right of society inuring to the benefit of an
agent for society (the police officer) in establishing law
and order and protecting the welfare and safety of society?
III. Does the decision of the Court of Appeals, Eighth
Appellate District of Ohio, upholding the search and
seizure, contravene the federal constitutional standards of
reasonableness prescribed by the Fourth Amendment?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
John W. Terry and Richard D. Chilton, the petitioners, were indicted on a charge of carrying a concealed
weapon, in violation of Section 2923.01 of the Revised
Code of Ohio. (See petition Appendix E, page 35.) A
pretrial motion to suppress the evidence was overruled,
and, upon a plea of not guilty, the court, sitting without a
jury, returned a verdict of guilty as to both defendants.
The relevant facts are as follows: At approximately
2:30 p.m. of October 31, 1963, a Cleveland detective witL\
39 years and 4 months police experience observed two
men, later identified as John W. Terry and Richard D.
Chilton, engaged in behavior, on the comer of East 14th
Street and Euclid Avenue (in downtown Cleveland),
which immediately attracted his attention and aroused his
suspicions. Positioning himself across the street he observed these men for approximately ten to twelve minutes.
One remained at the comer, the other walked several
hundred feet up the street, peered into the window of
either a diamond store or an airline office and then returned to the corner to converse with the other. In turn
the other person would leave the comer, repeat these actions and return to the comer. This procedure was repeated at least two to five times by each man. During this
period, a third man, later identified as Carl Katz, approached the corner, spoke briefly with the two men, departed and stationed himself across the street. The two
men resumed their pattern of conduct, each making four
to six trips. The two men then proceeded west on Euclid
and at 1120 Euclid Avenue where they encountered the
third male who was positioned there, and who had spoken
with them previously. The detective testified: "* * * I
didn't like their actions on Huron Road, and I suspected
them of casing a job, a stick-up * * *" (R. 42) .
.2s
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With this belief in mind, the detective approached
the three men, who were engaged in conversation, identified himself as .a police officer, and asked for their names.
Receiving only a mumbled, incoherent response by one or
all (R. 28), the officer took hold of one (later identified as
Terry), and turned him around in front of the officer
facing the other two. He then patted Terry, the man in
front of him. At no time did his hands reach into any
pockets (R. 29-30). In patting Terry, in the upper left
pocket of the top coat the officer felt a gun (R. 29). At this
point the detective ordered the three men from the street
to the interior of a nearby store. Retaining the appellant
Terry by the collar of his coat he ordered all three to face
the wall and place the palms of their hands against the
wall. The detective then pulled the coat by the collar,
from the rear to the shoulders of Terry, exposing in the
upper left inside coat pocket a concealed revolver. The
gun was removed by the detective. Subsequent examination proved it to be loaded. The officer proceeded to "pat
down on the outside of his clothing" the second man,
Chilton. He then felt an object in the left overcoat pocket
which felt like a gun. He inserted his hand and removed
a fully loaded revolver. A similar "patting down" of Katz
revealed nothing. The three men were then taken to the
police station where Terry and Chilton were charged with
Carrying Concealed Weapons.
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LAW AND ARGUMENT.
Preliminary Statement.
Through a long series of landmark decisions, lawyers
and society have in the past years witnessed an affi.rmance
of basic principles and rights in the area of criminal law.
The reintroduction and affirmance of these rights into the
American scene have been interpreted by many as irrevocably altering the face and character of society. The
significance of these decisions and their contribution
toward our legal and social progress in the intervening
years is beyond question, but as with every major innovation, these decisions carry with them an inherent potential
for misinterpretation, misuse and abuse on the part of
some individuals and organizations, however good their
intentions may be.
Realizing that the future of our Nation must rest on
the shoulders of her patriotic, law-abiding citizens and on
laws that protect the individual rights of those citizens,
laws that protect a free society where those citizens live,
and a fair and impartial administration of all those laws
by the courts, and although we stand with others against
those who seek to deprive or limit that patriotic law abiding citizen of any of his basic rights, as guaranteed by the
Constitution and reintroduced by the many landmark decisions, it is our position that the shield of these rights
should be used as such and not as a weapon by those who
in zealous application (deliberately or innocently) who
would misuse, misinterpret, or abuse them. We stand not
only for the protection of individual rights, but also the
rights of society to protection from evildoers. No right
under the Constitution is so absolute or self operating that
it can be permitted to conduct a bleeding operation on the
very society which has given it birth and nourishment.

6

This is basically what is being requested by these who
would have the Court overturn the decision which is the
subject of review in this case.
It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that every
frisking or patting down of any individual whom the police
have detained for questioning is an invasion of the right
to privacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
irrespective of the "unreasonable" test. It is their contention that the Fourth Amendment guarantees the absolute right of freedom from such action by law enforcement
officers.

The first question posed is then:
I. Can the protection guaranteed to individuals by the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States be said to encompass any
absolute right irrespeciive· of such restraints as the
safety and welfare of the public may require?
The answer is found in decisions of this Court concerning the right of freedom of speech and freedom of
religion.
As early as 1890 in Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333,
the Court said, "* * * with man's relations to his Maker
a.nd the obligations he may think they impose, and the
manner in which an expression shall be made by him of
his belief on these subjects, no interference can be permitted, provided always the laws of society, designed to
secure its peace and prosperity, and the morals of its
people, are not interfered with. ::fiowever free exercise of
religion may be, it must be subordinate to the criminal
laws of the country, passed with reference to actions re-
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garded by general consent as properly the subject of punitive legislation."
The freedom of speech and of the press, which is
secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute
right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever
one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license
that gives immunity for every possible use of language, and
prevent the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.
Gitlam v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625.
"The safeguarding and fructification of free and constitutional institutions is the very basis and mainstay upon
which the freedom of the press rest, and that freedom,
therefore, does not and cannot be held to include the
right to virtually destroy such ins~tutions; however complete is the right of the press to state public things and discuss them, that right as every other right enjoyed in
human society, is subject to the restraints which separate
right from wrong doing." Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United
States, 247 U. S. 402, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 560.
The right of free speech is not an absolute one, and
the state, in the exercise of its police power, may punish
its abuse by those who indulge in utterances which incite
to violence and crime and threaten the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means. Strongberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 532.
Liberty of speech and of the press is not an absolute
right, and the state may punish its abuse. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625.
Thus we find from a long line of decisions that the law
as it applies to question one has long been so well settled
that it is unnecessary to do more than state it whenever
the occasion arises.
12
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It can therefore be assumed that the constitutional
right to protection against unreasonable search and
seizure is not absolute where the safety and welfare of the
police officer and of the public are concerned.
II. The exercise of "stop and frisk" based on probable
cause is one of those restrictive limitations permitted
to the state as circumscribing the provisions of the
Fourth Amendment for the protection of the safety
and welfare of the people.
Such right must inure to the benefit of the people
through their lawful agent, the police officer.
"The right of freedom of speech and press * * * as
every other right enjoyed in human society, is subject to
the restraints which separate right from wrongdoing."
Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, supra.
The state is necessarily invested with the police power
which is the expression of the-popular conception of the
necessities of social and economic conditions and under
which may be done that which will best secure the peace,
morals, health and safety of the community. Bloomfield
v. State, 86 0. S. 253, 99 N. E. 309, 41 L. R. A. (NS) 726,
Am. Cas. 1913 D, 629 (affirming the Circuit Court, which
affirmed, without opinion State v. Bloomfield, 13 N. P.
(NS) 121) .
The governmental body thus is given the right to act
or limit individual rights of the constitution in the area of
securing peace, morals, health and safety of the community.
The Court of Appeals in rendering its opinion in the
instant case has stated:
"The right of the proper authorities to stop and
question persons in suspicious circumstances has its
333
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roots in early English practice where it was approved
by the courts and the common law commentators.
See, 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, 122, 129 (6th
Ed. 1787): 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown, 89, 96-97
(Amer. Ed. 1847): Lawrence vs. Hedger, 3 Taunt.
14, 128 Eng. Rep. 6 (C. P. 1810). Today, in several
states, the authority of police officers to detain suspects for a reasonable time for questioning is granted
by statute. E.G., N. Y. Code of Crim. Pros., Sec. 180A
(1965 Supp.): Gen. Laws of R. I., Sec. 12-7-1 (1956):
N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann., Ch. 594, Sec. 2 (1955): 11 Del.
Ann. Code, Sec. 1902 (1953): Warner, The Uniform
Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315 (1942): Mass. Gen.
Laws, Ch. 41, Sec. 98 (1961). In others, the right is
recognized by court decisions, E.g., People vs. Rivera,
14 N. Y. (2d) 441 (1964): Gisske vs. Sanders, 9 Cal.
App. 13 (1908): People vs. Fagenkrantz, 21 Ill (2d)
75 (1961).
The United States Supreme Court, however, has
never squarely decided whether the police may constitutionally stop and question a suspect without his
consent in the absence of adequate grounds for arrest. However, the lower federal courts permit such
field interrogations. See, Henry vs. United States,
361 U. S. 98, 106 (1959) (Clark, J. dissenting):
Brinegar vs. U. S., 338 U. S. 160, 178 (1949) (Burton, J. concurring): Keiningham vs. United States,
307 F. (2d) 632 (D. C. Cir. 1962), cert. den. 371 U.
S. 948 (1963): Busby vs. United States, 296 F. (2d)
328 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. den. 369 U. S. 876 (1962).
The cases also indicate that an officer may stop and
question even though he has insufficient grounds to
make an arrest. See, Ellis vs. United States, 264 F.
(2d) 372 (D. C. Cir.), cert. den. 359 U.S. 998 (1959):
United States vs. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 78 (S.
D. N. Y. 1960), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.,
U. S. vs. Buffalino, 285 F. (2d) 408 (2d Cir. 1960),
cited with approval in U. S. vs. Vita, 294 F. (2d) 524,
530 (2d Cir. 1961).
l34
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Admittedly there is some division of authority on
the legality of the right to stop and question; however,
the better view seems to be that the stopping and
questioning of suspicious persons is not prohibited by
the Constitution. See, Note, 50 Cornell L. Q. 529,
533 (1965); United States vs. Vita, 294 F . (2d) 254
(2d Cir. 1961), cert. den. 369 U. S. 823 (1962). Of
great persuasive authority do we consider the long
line of California cases, decided under the rule of
People vs. Cahan, 44 Cal. (2d) 434 (1955) in which
this practice has been upheld. E.g., People vs. Martin,
46 Cal. (2d) 106 (1956); People vs. Simon, 45 Cal.
(2d) 645 (1955); People vs. Jones, 176 Cal. App. (2d)
265 (1959). Also of great persuasive authority is the
recent New York Court of Appeals decision in People
vs. Rivera, 14 N. Y. (2d) 441 (1964) wherein this
practice was also upheld. The courts of Ohio do not
appear to have been squarely presented with this
problem before. Therefore, we hold, in line with the
great weight of authority, that a policeman may, under appropriate circumstances such as exist in this
case, reasonably inquire -of a person concerning his
suspicious on-the-street behavior in the absence of
reasonable grounds to arrest.
An individual who acts in a suspicious manner
invites a preliminary inquiry by the proper authority.
It does not unreasonably invade the individual's right
to privacy to hold that the price of indulgence in
suspicious behavior is a police inquiry. See, Traynor,
Mapp vs. Ohio At Large In The Fifty States, 1962
Duke L. J. 319 (1962). Such a minor interference
with personal liberty would "touch the right of privacy only to serve it well." Traynor, supra, at p. 334.
If such questioning failed to reveal probable cause,
it would thereby forestall invalid arrests of innocent
persons on inadequate cause and the attendant invasion of personal liberty and reputation. If it revealed probable cause, it would do no more than open
the way to a valid arrest. The business of the police
335

11
is not only to solve crimes after they occur, but to
prevent them from taking place whenever it is legally
possible. As stated by the New York Court of Appeals
in the recent case of People vs. Rivera, supra, at p.
444:
'The authority of the police to stop defendant
and question him in the circumstances is perfectly
clear. * * * Promr4: inquiry into suspicious or unusual street action is an indispensable police power
in the orderly government of large urban communities. It is a prime function of city police to be
alert to things going wrong in ·the streets; if they
were denied the right to such summary inquiry, a
normal power and a necessary duty would be
closed off.'
Admittedly, this power to inquire may be abused.
But the possibility of some future infraction should
not require that the police should now be made
powerless to make reasonable inquiries into suspicious
behavior. If such abuses arise, we shall deal with
them when the time comes. However, for the present,
we hold that under the facts of this case, the detective's
inquiry was reasonable under the conditions presented."
It is well settled that there is nothing ipso facto unconstitutional in the brief detention of citizens under circumstances not justifying an arrest, for purpose of limited
inquiry in the cause of routine police investigations. Rios
v. United States, 364 U. S. 253, 80 S. Ct. 1431, 4 L. Ed.
2d 1688 (1960); Busby v. United States, 296 F. 2d 328 (9th
Cir. 1961).
The local policeman, in addition to having a duty to
enforce the criminal laws of his jurisdiction, is also in a
very real sense a guardian of the public peace and he has
a duty in the course of his work to be alert for suspicious
circumstances, and, provided that he acts within consti336
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tutional limits, to investigate whenever such circumstances
indicate to him that he should do so. Frye v. U. S., 315
F. 2d 491 at 494 (9th Cir. 1963).
While the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures makes no distinction between informal detention without cause and formal arrest
without cause, there is a difference between that cause
which will justify informal detention short of arrest and
the probable cause required to justify that kind of custody
traditionally denominated an arrest. Wilson vs. Porter,
361 F. 2d 412.
Due regard for the practical necessities of effective
law enforcement requires that the validity of brief, informal detention be recognized whenever it appears from
totality of circumstances that the detaining officers could
have had reasonable grounds for their action, and a
founded suspicion is all that is necessary, that is, some
basis from which the court can determine that detention
was not arbitrary or harassing. Wilson v. Porter, supra.
When the detention of defendant by police, initially
for purpose of investigating his identity, became an arrest
was to be determined under state law subject to such minimum constitutional standards as the United States Supreme Court had prescribed. Wilson v. Porter, su.pTa.
Here upon the discovery of the revolver the police
were confronted with a felony. (Ohio Revised Code 2923.01.) For this there was probable cause to arrest. Commonwealth v. Ballow, Jr.: 217 N. E. 2d 187 (1966). Commonwealth v . Phelps, 209 Mass. 396, 404, 95 N. E. 868. Commonwealth v. Holmes, 344 Mass. 524, 525, 183 N. E. 2d
279; People v. Mickel.son, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 450, 451, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 18, 380 P. 2d 658 and cases cited. People v. Rivera,
14 N. Y. 2d 441, 447, 252 N. Y. S. 2d 458, 201 N. E. 2d
337
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32, cert. den. sub nom. RiveTa, v. N. Y., 379 U.S. 978, 85
S. Ct. 679, 13 L. ed. 2d 568.
The test to be applied in determining whether search
and seizure is unreasonable is whether the thing done,
in sum of its form, scope, nature, incidents and effect,
impresses as being fundamentally unfair or unreasonable
in the specific situation when the immediate end sought is
considered against the private right affected. State v.
Hagan, 137 N. W. 2d 895. United States v. Haskins, D. C.
E. D. Tenn. 1962, 213 F. Supp. 551; United States v. Cook,
D. C. E. D. Tenn. 1962, 213 F. Supp. 568; Schwimmer v.
U.S., C. A. 8th (1956), 232 F. 2d 855, cert. den. 352 U.S.
833, 77 S. Ct. 48, 1 L. Ed. 2nd 52.
Presence of automobiles near scene of crimes under
suspicious circumstances, however slight, imposes upon
police the duty to stop and question the occupants, inspect or search them, and remove incriminating evidence
found therein. To hold otherwise would make a farce
of the police protection to which all citizens are entitled.
State ex rel. Ogg v. Iahash, 140 N. W. 2d 692.
In State v . Herdman, 130 N. W. 2d 628, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota uses the following language.
"In the argument before this court it appears to
be the claim of the defendant that the evidence used
against him was the product of an exploratory search
without probable cause in violation of his rights under
the 4th and 14th Amendments. It seems to be further
urged that since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 81 S.
Ct. 1684, 6 L. ed. 2d 1081, police officers are not permitted to accost a suspicious character on a public
street for questioning. While the Mapp case and
numerous decisions recently handed down by the
United States Supreme Court clearly establish that
under state and federal procedure citizens are entitled to uniform protection from unreasonable
8
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searches and seizures, we do not understand that
these decisions have gone so far as to require or suggest that state police officers follow precise procedures
in making arrests, searches and seizures. The Fourth
Amendment protects the individual only from 'unreasonable' searches and seizures; and whether a
search and seizure is 'unreasonable' must depend
upon the particular facts of each case.
"Nor do we feel that the legality of the arrest of
defendant is tainted because the police officers accosted and interviewed defendant without actual information that he was carrying stolen property in his
automobile. Under the circumstances here, the police officers did no more than what they were required
to do in performance of their duties. * * *
"Persons found under suspicious circumstances
are not clothed with a right of privacy which prevents police officers from inquiring as to their identity
and actions. The essential needs of public safety permit police officers to use the faculties of observation
and to act thereon within proper limits."
To justify the seizure of a weapon which could be used
against the arresting officer we shall not draw a fine line
measuring the possible risk to the officer's safety. The
officer should be permitted to take every reasonable precaution to safeguard his life in the process of making the
arrest. State vs. Riley, 402 P. 2d 741 (1965) .
Circumstances short of probable cause to make an
arrest may still justify officers stopping pedestrians or
motorists on streets for questioning, and if circumstances
warrant, officer may, in self-protection, superfically search
suspect for concealed weapons, and should investigation
then reveal probable cause to make an arrest, officer may
arrest suspect and conduct reasonable search incidental
thereto. People v. Jliachel, 44 Cal. Rpts. 126 (1965) .
339
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While rule permitting temporary detention for questioning is operative under circumstances short of probable
cause to make an arrest, there must exist some suspicious
or unusual circumstance to authorize even this limited
invasion of citizen's privacy. People v. Machel, supra.
Reasonable investigatory techniques may be pursued
by police indoors as well as outdoors, and it is not unreasonable for officers to seek interviews with suspects or
witnesses or to call upon them at their homes for such
purpose. People v. Machel, supra.
Generally police officers may detain and question
persons when circumstances are such as would indicate to
reasonable man in a like position that such course is necessary to proper discharge of duty. People v . Machel, supra.
Reasonable search without warrant is valid where
it is incidental to lawful arrest, and a seizure during such
a search of evidence used in commission of crime for which
arrest is made is permissible. People v . Machel, supra.
"Reasonable Cause" had been generally defined to be
such state of facts as would lead man of ordinary care and
prudence to believe and consciously entertain an honest
and strong suspicion that person is guilty of crime. People
v . Machel, supra.
Question of probable cause to justify defendant's arrest and search must be tested on facts which records
show were known to officers at time arrest was made.
Supra. Also People v. Hernandez , 40 Cal. Repts. 100.
"The right of police to investigate gives r ise to right
to conduct reasonable search for weapons in order to protect safety of officer." People v. Garrett, 4 7 Cal. Rpts. 731
(1966).
The rule that circumstances short of probable cause to
make an arrest may still justify an officer stopping pedestrians or motorists on the street for questioning does not
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conflict with United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures, but
strikes a balance between a person's interest in immunity
from police interference and the community's interest in
law enforcement, and wards off pressure to equate reasonable cause to investigate with reasonable cause to arrest,
thus protecting the innocent from the risk of arrest when
no more than reasonable investigation is justified. People
v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. Rpts. 2d 448 (1963).
If we recognize the authority of the police to stop an
individual and inquire concerning unusual street events
(U. S. v . Vita, 294 F. 2d 524, 530: People v. Marendi, 213
- N. Y. 600, 609; in a similar direction, U. S. v. Bonamo,
180 F. Supp. 71, 81, 83, which although reversed on other
grounds sub nom. U. S. v. Buja.lino, 285 F. 2d 410, was
cited on this point with approval in Vita at page 530), we
are required to recognize the hazards involved in this kind
of public duty. The answer to the question propounded by
the policeman may be a bullet; in any case the exposure
to danger and the safety and welfare of the officer (the
public's interest) could be very great. The -frisk for
weapons is a reasonable and constitutionally permissible
precaution to minimize that danger in the interest of
safety and welfare.
We ought not, in deciding what is reasonable, close
our eyes to the actualities of street dangers encountered
in performing this kind of public duty.
We submit, therefore, that the "stop and frisk" (for
weapons) based on probable cause is constitutionally
permissible as inuring to the benefit of an agent for society (the policeman) in establishing law and order and
protecting the interest (safety and welfare) of society.
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ID. The decision of the Eighth District Court of Appeals,
which the petitioner is seeking to have this Court
overturn, does not contravene federal constitutional
standards of reasonableness prescribed by the Fourth
Amendment.
The search most commonly made by law enforcement
officers and the subject of the petitioners' complaint herein
is that of the person of the accused whom the officer had
arrested. Searches of the person, if made, must conform
to federal constitutional standards. The Fourth Amendment provides, in part, that:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated * * *."
A person may be searched by a search warrant, although this method is seldom used. The vast majority of
searches of the person are made incidental to lawful arrests. It is the law on this question of search with which
we will deal.
The English and American law has always recognized
the right on the part of the government to search the person of the accused when legally arrested. Weeks v. U. S.,
232 U. S. 383, 392 (1914); Abel v. U. S., 362 U. S. 217
(1960).
"The law on this subject has long been so well
settled that it is useless to do more than state it whenever the occasion arises." Lefkowitz v. U.S. Attorney,
52 F. 2d 52 (1931), aff. 285 U.S. 452.
The right to search applies to arrests for misdemeanors as well as to those for felonies, U. S. v. Snyde-r,
278 F . 650 (1922); Davis v. U. S., 328 U. S. 582 (1946)
assuming an arrest in the full sense of the term.
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The legal basis of the right to search is given by law
to the arresting officer for three reasons:
1. to protect the officer against harm;
2. to deprive the prisoner of potential means of
escape; and
3. to prevent destruction of evidence by the arrested
person.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in U. S. v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Abel v. U. S., supra at 236.
If the arrest of the person is unlawful, any subsequent
search made incidental to arrest is unreasonable. U. S. v.
DiRe, 332 U. S. 581 (1948); Brandon v. U. S., 270 F. 2d
311 (1959), Note 5, cert. den. 362 U. S. 943; Bynus v.
U. S., 262 U. S. 465; Williams v. U. S., 237 F. 2d 789
(1956).
No matter how valid the arrest may be in a technical
sense, if the court finds that it was used by the officers
simply as a pretext to make a search of the person, the
search is unreasonable. Taglavore v. U. S., 291 F. 2d 262
(1961). "An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search
for evidence." U. S. v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452 (1932).
The search of the person, incidental to arrest should
be made by one or more of the arresting officers. U.S. v.
Grieco, 25 F. R. D. 58 (1960).
The officer's right to make a search of the person incidental to arrest being predicated upon the arrest, the
search must follow the arrest, not precede it. White v.
U. S., 271 F. 2d 829 (1959); U. S. v. Hamn, 163 F. Supp.
4 (1958).
At this point the distinction made by the trial court
and the appellate court comes into this case. It is submitted that the foregoing rule in the White and Hamn
cases and the decision in the Mapp case will not outlaw
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a state officer's frisking or even a search of the person
made prior to arrest. Under the Uniform Arrest Act,
adopted with modifications in Delaware, New Hampshire
and Rhode Island, "a peace officer may search for a dangerous weapon any person whom he has stopped or detained
to question as provided in Section 2, whenever he has reasonable ground to believe that he is in danger if the person
possesses a dangerous weapon. If the officer :finds a
weapon, he may take and keep it until the completion of
the questioning, when he shall either return it or arrest
the person." The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Virginia Law
Review 315 at 344 (1942) .
. The petitioners argue, of course, that a frisking is a
search in the full meaning of that term. The frisk as it is
described in the actual events that occurred in this case,
however, and as it is generally understood in police usage,
is a contact or patting of the outer clothing of a person to
detect by the sense of touch if a concealed weapon is being
carried. The frisk is less such an invasion of the person
in degree than an initial full search of the person would
be. It ought to be distinguishable also on pragmatic
grounds from the degree of constitutional protection that
would surround a full-blown search of the person.
This is exactly the distinction the trial judge made:
"The constitutional restriction is against unreasonable searches; not against all searches. And what
is reasonable always involves a balancing of interest:
here the security of the public order and the lives of
the police are to be weighed against a minor inconvenience and petty indignity. A similar police procedure has long been sustained in California." People v . Martin, 46 Cal. 2d 106 (1956).
As the Court of Appeals noted, a State is not precluded
from developing :workable rules governing searches to
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meet the practical demands of effective criminal investigations on law enforcement if the state does not violate the
constitutional standard of what is reasonable. Ker v.
Calif., 374 U. S. 23, 34, 31 LW 4611.
It is therefore urged that the issue raised by the petition for certiorari has been effectively disposed of in the
decisions of the Ohio courts sustaining the legal authority
of a police officer to stop and question persons upon some
probable cause and, if need be, to frisk for weapons to insure the protection of the officer and the safety and welfare of the community.
It is argued by the petitioners that the trial court
made a finding that the arrest was unlawful and that after
making such a finding of illegal arrest the court should
have suppressed the evidence. We cannot agree with this.
The trial court never held that these men were illegally
arrested in this case. The court merely said that had the
arrests preceded the frisking of the men, such arrests
would then have been illegal. The court then delineated
the distinction between "frisking" as commonly practiced
by police officers when they stop a suspect and the search
of the person incident to arrest.
If we accept the law of "stop and frisk" as a benefit
to society in the interest of safety and welfare, the subsequent factual situation must be looked into in the light
of that law to establish whether we have a legal arrest and
a search incident thereto.
There appears to be no question but that the trial
judge, defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney all
agree that up to the point the petitioners were frisked by
the detective probable cause for an arrest did not exist.
Petitioners contend that the arrest occurred when the men
were stopped notwithstanding the decision of the Court of
Appeals that the stopping did not constitute an arrest.
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What, then, was in the mind of the officer after he
had observed the activities of the petitioners which led
him to conclude that they were "casing a place for a stickup"? From the testimony it can only be concluded that the
officer approached the three men solely for the purpose of
routine interrogation and had no intention of detaining
them beyond the momentary requirements of that mission. Upon identifying himself as a police officer and asking them their names and their responding by muttering
something incomprehensible, coupled with his conclusions
made from his prior observations ("they were casing a
job, a stick-up"), the officer was confronted with only one
course of action to a good police officer. Frisk for weapons
for protection of his own life. "I wanted to see if they had
any guns." (R. 137.) To this point in our facts there is
no basis for an arrest. Had the officer frisked and found
nothing there would have been no grounds for an arrest.
The officer while frisking, through his sense of touch
felt a bulge in the upper left breast pocket which he decided was a gun. We must at this point recall that
here is an officer with thirty-nine years experience and
training, who has had countless opportunities to recognize
the presence of weapons concealed under a suspect's
clothing. Applying this to the observations of these men
which he had made previously, the only intelligent conclusion that a trained police officer could make was that
the defendant was at that time committing a felony in
the presence of the officer by carrying a concealed weapon.
To this point there has been no arrest, no search. Arrest
followed immediately thereafter when the men were ordered to move inside the store and place their hands
against the wall. Where there was no previous intent to
detain, there is now; where there was no previous probable
cause to arrest, there is now. The defendants are not free
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to go at liberty. They were under arrest. Even though
technical words of "you are under arrest" were not spoken,
a valid arrest had been made.
Arrest is to deprive a person of his liberty by legal
authority. The seizing of a person and detaining him in
the custody of the law. R. C. Section 2935.01, Bouvier's
Law DictionaTy, Baldwin's Revision.
An arrest in criminal law signifies the apprehension
or detention of the person of another in order that he may
be forthcoming to answer an alleged or supposed crime.
5 0. Jur. 2d, Arrest Sec. 3.
Arrest is the taking, seizing, or detaining of the person of another, either by touching or putting hands on
him, or by any act which indicates an intention to take
him into custody and subject the person to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest. 5 0. JuT. 20,
Arrest Sec. 2, 57 0. Jur. 2d Words & Phrases 70.
It was not until after the act of arresting these men
that an actual search of their persons was made.
Thus, here we have a lawful arrest after, not before,
the frisk. The search of the person incidental to said
arrest is therefore lawful. Weeks v. U. S ., s'llpra; Abel v .
U. S., supTa; Lefkowitz v. U. S. Attorney, supra.
In discussing all the facts and law pertaining to this
case, in addition to the state's position being sustained by
the law there is sound public policy reasons which dictate
that the Court of Appeals' ruling should be upheld. As was
indicated in the Rivera case, supra, "The business of the
police is to prevent crime if they can. Prompt inquiry
into suspicious or unusual street action is an indispensable
police power in the orderly government of large urban
communities. * * * if they were to be denied the right of
such summary inquiry, a normal power and a necessary
duty would be closed off."
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A consideration of the law, public policy, and the
interest of the community compels the conclusion that the
conduct of the police was not violative of the federal constitutional standards of reasonableness prescribed by the
Fourth Amendment and that the decision of the Court of
Appeals upholding such conduct properly applied such
constitutional standards.
Since there is no justiciable issue that has not been
decided in accordance with applicable law, we respectfully
submit that the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied.
Respectfully submitted,

T. CORRIGAN,
Prosecuting Attorney for
Cuyahoga County, Ohio,
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